operations of the "open secret" or "the double bind of a secrecy that must always be rigorously maintained in the face of a secret that everybody already knows" (195) . In other words, we know Miller has a secret, and we even know what the secret is, but we nonetheless must believe him when he tells us (four pages after the ofWcial beginning of his article) that "we begin, then, not with myself, but with the Wrst paragraph of Dickens' text" (195) . Basically, we are told to forget Miller's false start and by extension the "hopelessly entangled" moments of the public and private in his/our/all scholarly projects. In fact, Miller advises his readers that any such lingering in the personal would result in "those mortifying charges [of] sentimentality, self-indulgence, narcissism" (193) . He warns, "it is bad enough to tell tales out of school, but to tell them in school-or what comes to the same, in a text wholly destined for the academy-would be intolerable" (193) . Here then, I Wnd myself going against Miller's generous advice, as it is precisely these "intolerable" moments of autobiographical reXection and personal investment within the academic text that I want to discuss further-alas, in another "text wholly destined for the academy."
At this present moment in the history of critical practices, Miller's warnings about confessional discourses within academic texts and his own autobiographical coyness, however pretended, in "Secret Subjects, Open Secrets" may seem a bit old-fashioned or outdated to many of us anyway. If Miller suggests that a purposeful forgetting or knowing ignorance characterizes authorial investments within academic writing, then there are plenty since his 1985 pronouncement who have refused to let us forget their presence in a text! Gillian Brown in fact declares, "the rhetorical mode of late twentieth-century academic criticism appears to be confessional" (103) . As the ever-growing bulk of autobiographical writing by academics suggests, these days there is nothing particularly (sorry, Miller) "intolerable" about the articulation of autobiographical information within critical contexts.
Yet, it is a mistake to suggest that a banal acceptance of the personal is true for all academic writers or that there are no risks in such critical practices. I myself chose to begin with D. A. Miller not simply because I believe his scholarly performance of the "open secret" cleverly exposes the autobiographical dimensions of all academic projects, and consequently demonstrates the interconnectedness of personal and theoretical concerns, but because Miller expresses a keen awareness of those punitive conditions of self-disclosure that may be especially relevant to scholars with queer identities to profess. To me, it is precisely Miller's own role as a gay scholar that makes his clever essay more nuanced than merely a wonderfully camped-up admission of personal bias and interestedness. Instead, I understand Miller's remarks on the "open secret" of subjectivity, and the related issues of professionalism and critical authority, as an early and important engagement with the intersections of the academic and the queer.
There are several reasons an investigation of such an intersection is consequential to contemporary scholarly communities, queer or otherwise. However, Judith Halberstam in "Between Butches" identiWes a condition of the academically autobiographical that is especially noteworthy for queer academics, and it is one that I want to acknowledge Wrst. Citing both Judith Butler and Ester Newton as examples of academic writers who have shared glimpses (however brief) of their own masculinities, Halberstam notes the value she took from learning that "there are selves behind the projects and those selves are deeply invested in discovering how to articulate desires and genders that we have been told make no sense" (63). Halberstam suggests that writing autobiographically can offer "intellectual sponsorship" and a sense of connectedness "in the absence of Xesh and blood models" (64, 62) . Of course, my own attraction to academic autobiographics surely has something to do with such a desire for community and professional models-things that are difWcult to locate in most academic spaces, which remain decidedly heteronormative. Despite my efforts in this essay to complicate the production of queer visibilities within academic contexts, I do not wish to take for granted the very important ways such public disclosures offer the possibility of identiWcation and guidance, because my own need to Wnd ways of negotiating sexual identity in the academy (and the ways various writers have answered that interest) forms the genesis of this discussion.
In his introduction to Confessions of the Critics, H. Aram Veeser conWrms that personal material shared within critical contexts is of wide interest, observing that although "the autobiographical segment may occupy no more than forty seconds of a forty-minute talk . . . the audience will ask questions only about the forty seconds" (3). 1 While these moments capture our attention, actually submitting autobiographical material to theoretical and political analysis is an altogether more delicate task. Indeed, it is very possible that paying critical attention to autobiographical tactics within academic texts may be considered as superWcially anecdotal or a social impropriety, perhaps even an unethical attack on the individual instead of an argument or rhetorical move made by that person. Laura Alexandra Harris, for instance, wonders, "how can we argue, disagree, and evaluate the personal without attacking the person?" (7). Rachel Brownstein observes that many move away from any thoughtful encounter with the personal in criticism simply because "when a critic puts her feelings and her body out there, whether in all apparent earnestness or in an elaborately playful game, it is even harder than usual to disagree and discuss things proWtably" (36). Despite the difWculty of such discussion, it is imperative to realize that, far from being exempt from academic and political consideration, the autobiographical within criticism is in full conversation with the vicissitudes of critical exchange. In other words, these moments not only interest us but also very much inXuence both knowledge production and reception.
To reiterate Sylvia Molloy's astute realization in PMLA's 1996 special forum on the place of the personal in scholarship, the autobiographical is not some kind of innocently intimate communication between writer and reader but "is calculated, is in fact a performance" (1073). Likewise using the language of performance to describe the autobiographical act, Candace Lang adds, "Autobiographical elements incorporated into a critical argument become, by virtue of their inclusion in such a context, staged events" (51). With a certain amount of pessimism, she continues, "the 'I' of personal criticism disarms you by appearing to drop all pretense and speak frankly, honestly, and candidly, san arrière-pensée. But, as they say, get real: there is always a hidden agenda" (50). It is less my belief that there is some kind of "hidden agenda" behind the autobiographical that I shall unmask but rather that the academically autobiographical, like all discourses of self-representation, is necessarily implicated in processes of (self)interpretation that are culturally (per)formed. Accordingly, I make the claim that the autobiographical within queer studies provides a locus from which we can address the difference that sexual difference makes in the discursive production of academic knowledge. I also hope to convey here that the complex meanings of difference, sexual or otherwise, within academic spaces are changing, that this then is not a static conversation but one that can and must be revisited and revised.
For instance, since the Wrst-person singular, most especially a homosexual or otherwise queer "I" has tended to operate as a professional risk and instant epistemological disqualiWcation, the unprecedented level of queer visibility in the academy is commonly observed as advancement in the legitimacy or tolerance of sexual difference. However, along with other emerging critiques of such an unproblematized celebration of visibility politics, Eric O. Clarke in Virtuous Vice: Homoeroticism and the Public Sphere makes the important caveat, As beneWcial as working toward greater lesbian and gay visibility can be, doing so more often than not fails to scrutinize the other value determinations that exceed the purview of homophobia or heterosexism. This is not to say that efforts toward antihomophobic representational inclusion can be dispensed with-far from it. However . . . one must come to terms with the range of representational dynamics through which this articulation may be achieved. (19) I agree with Clarke that it is enormously useful to put analytical pressure on the circumstances under which sexual self-disclosures take place in order to better understand the shifting and conXicted place of queer identities, which are becoming altogether less secret and more open. In fact, I suggest here that current conventions for argumentation in the academy may actually precipitate queer autobiographics as a convenient prop for heteronormative universalism.
Within an academic landscape saturated with Foucaldian insight, some might consider it unnecessary to reemphasize the conclusion that while sexual self-representation rests upon the promise of transgression, it yet may simultaneously serve-whether overtly or inadvertently-as an apparatus for normalization, and that visibility politics are caught up within a power-knowledge dynamic of heteronormative abjection despite promises of antihomophobic reverse discourses. Notwithstanding our sophisticated theoretical familiarity with these sorts of ideas, I insist that their implications are immediate to the developing enterprise of queer studies, where questions about the perils, privileges, and resistant possibilities of queer visibility are as current as ever for many of us. Recognizing how the selfrepresentational (as commonly deployed) fails to destabilize the norms of academic argumentation not only challenges the theoretical integrity of contemporary queer theory as a resolutely antinormative methodology but also proposes long-range concerns about the hazardous logics of margin and center at stake within the disciplining of queer studies as a new academic Weld. Accordingly, a more thorough critical evaluation of visibility politics need necessarily consider academic autobiographics as an undertheorized site of inclusion and exclusion. Here, on a more expansive level, I seek to trouble the normative operations of academic cultures by questioning the treatment of sexuality and gender, among other identities, as a source of (dis)qualiWcation. among older tenured faculty, the culture of silence that was once unquestionably necessary for survival remains difWcult to break. Among nontenured faculty, the poor state of the job market makes the cost of coming out too high. Staying in the closet is the price that one has to pay for an academic career. (132) D'Emilio's personal reXections on the formation of the Gay Academic Union in 1973 and his fearful decision to write a dissertation on gay history (when such a thing was unheard of) are particularly compelling testaments to how far the conditions for scholarship on gay and lesbian themes have transformed in the past three decades. Back then, D'Emilio was able to count on his hands the number of nonphobic, scholarly examinations of homosexuality and those gay and lesbian academic writers to have come out in print (140 (Garber, ed.) report staying closeted professionally and forgoing interests in queer scholarship until after being tenured, and to advising their graduate students to do the same. Suzanne de Castell and Mary Bryson remind us of the everyday professional risks of proclaiming a queer subject position: "reactions of anger, verbal abuse, and distinctly punitive student evaluations of competence" to "daily acts of heterosexism, long-term social exclusion, personal and professional marginalization, and constant 'reminders' (read threats) about upcoming tenure and performance reviews" (286-87). William G. Tierney, in his book-length study of gay men and lesbians in the academy Academic Outlaws: Queer Theory and Cultural Studies in the Academy, notes that under such homophobic conditions of academic life the "vast majority of academe remains closeted and invisible" (xii). Tierney adds, "until recently, the overwhelming response by homosexual authors has been to avoid marking oneself as gay or lesbian" (xi).
QUEER SUBJECTS, OPEN SECRETS
While the ubiquity of the closet strikes me as certainly true for some in higher education, this does not account for the increasing number of scholars working on queer theory and gay, lesbian, or transgender studies where "passing" is a much more complicated enterprise, perhaps even an impossibility. It is important that we as academics, both straight and queer, realize that one of the ways queer and/or gay and lesbian scholarship appears as self-referential actually has little to do with any confessional act performed within writing. Attesting to Adrienne Rich's theory that the strictures of compulsory heterosexuality render everyone naturally heterosexual until declared otherwise, queer criticism is often read as such an announcement of homosexual identity. For instance, in a recent post to the job forum section of The Chronicle of Higher Education, a person described preparing "out" and "closeted" versions of her vita, one where she listed publications in gay and lesbian studies and one where she did not. 2 Reina Lewis in her article "The Death of the Author and the Resurrection of the Dyke" explains an automatic slippage between critical writers and objects of study if one is working on lesbian sexualities. She writes, "although many cultural critics are moving towards an inscription of themselves into the critical text . . . there is simply no possibility of avoiding this for writers engaged in lesbian critical activities. It is invariably assumed that anyone who writes on lesbian subjects is herself lesbian" (Lewis 17). Whereas Lewis speciWes those who work on lesbian criticism as faced with personal association with their subject matter, David Halperin points to a similar problem for out gay men, contending that the sexual life of the gay critic is inseparable from the various meanings attached to his work (6-13). While Lewis and Halperin come at the issue of lesbian and gay identities within the academy from somewhat different directions, taken together they end up suggesting a double bind: a queer inquiry "outs" the critic and a queer critic necessitates a queer inquiry.
Though the personal dimensions behind queer theoretical projects may be prematurely or wrongly assumed, the relation between one's sexual identity and one's scholarship is still a weighty matter not least of all due to the crisis in authority that the public revelation of queerness may engender. Since homosexuality (as both subject of inquiry and as an identity claim) is deemed excessively personal in a way that heterosexuality in its normativity is not, it is unsurprising that Halperin pinpoints the source of his anxiety as an issue of authority: "how, as a gay man, an academic, and a public intellectual, I can acquire and maintain the authority to speak, to be heard, and to be taken seriously without denying or bracketing my gayness" (8, original emphasis). Halperin helps to illuminate how negotiating personal positionalities and investments in academic spaces is not simply a question of appearing biased or too personal (as is often claimed by "personal critics" such as Jane Tompkins or Nancy K. Miller) but involves the epistemological limitations placed upon academic subjecthood-where speaking with critical authority is attenuated by queer self-identiWcation. Halperin explains that gay scholars face a "permanent crisis of authority," whereby sexual (self)identiWcation operates as "an instant disqualiWcation, exposes you to accusations of pathology and partisanship . . . and grants everyone else an absolute epistemological privilege over you" (10, 8) . Although personal writing in itself is troubling to the disinterestedness of traditional critical discourses, it is painfully clear to many of us that the speciWc information revealed by the autobiographical is of tremendous consequence.
Obviously then, the crisis of authority that Halperin speciWes is not limited to the auto/biographical positionalities of (white) gay men like him. Evelynn Hammonds indicates as much when she writes that black women scholars are also "discredit [ed] . . . as producers of knowledge and as speaking subjects" and always "already threatened with being sexualized and rendered inauthentic as knowledge producers in the academy by students and colleagues alike" (145, 146) . 3 Despite the differences in how blackness, womanhood, and gayness are read or rendered visible in the academy, Hammonds and Halperin similarly illustrate the fact that individual subjectivities or positionalities are differently valued. 4 Thus, Halperin's claim to lack authority as a gay man then must be considered alongside the privileges accrued around his gender, race, and not least of all his position as tenured faculty.
5 What Halperin might fail to fully account for is that queer (self)identiWcation, just as any other positionality, operates according to uneven, multiple, and immensely complex modalities of privilege that are embedded within one's race, gender, ethnicity, age, educational background, and location of employment (among countless other factors).
At the same time as we observe how the risks of the auto/biographical are differently and unevenly distributed, it is equally necessary to recognize and examine those surprising instances in which queer positionalities themselves might be privileged, credited, and endowed with authority in the contemporary academy. John Champagne in his book The Ethics of Marginality: A New Approach to Gay Studies provides an example of this sort of critical exercise. Although the impact of Champagne's interventions in academic culture have been hindered by his aggressive encounters with a variety of "privileged marginals" (the term he uses for "privileged members of cultural minorities"), he nonetheless offers compelling advice, those involved in the formation of the "emerging" discipline of gay and lesbian studies would do well to examine the ways in which their own intellectual production might inadvertently collude with the dominant structures of oppression that it is in their interest to oppose. (31) 6 While specifying his critical misgivings about the intellectual production of gay/lesbian/queer studies, Champagne notes brieXy the place of the autobiographical in his evaluation of the "privileged marginal," noting that "practitioners of gay and lesbian studies seem particularly vulnerable to being seduced by the academic star system" and "autobiographical narratives in particular unfortunately make possible . . . a kind of fetishization of the gay and lesbian academic" (90). SigniWcantly, Champagne criticizes the valorization of a few highly visible queer theorists on the grounds that such a practice might only reveal tokenized inclusion in the academy and that these visibilities rest problematically upon an identity politics in which "experiential, testimonial accounts of oppression . . . [are privileged] over intellectual interrogations of positioning" (91). I worry that Champagne's dismissal of autobiographical and experiential narratives in favor of so-called intellectual positionings rests partially upon theoretical snobbery; nonetheless, his work helps verify, pace Halperin, that an academic's (self)identiWcation with/as queer may not always operate as a disqualiWcation and limitation, namely when one's argument involves homosexuality, gender variance, or otherwise queer subjects. In fact, in her recent article on heterosexuality and queer theory, Stephanie Fairyington in The Gay and Lesbian Review asks the revealing question, "is there a weird sort of reversal at work, in which some scholars of sexuality and gender worry about risking their legitimacy by coming out as straight?" (33). As is partially evidenced by this question, the articulation of personal experience or group identity is a valued and perhaps even required element of academic work on gay, lesbian, transgender, and other queer topics.
Therefore, even as personal association exists as one of the risks of queer studies, it also serves as one of the equally problematic "beneWts." In response to this situation, Champagne offers the following recommendation, "perhaps only a continuously unfolding deconstruction of one's privileged position as native informant might complicate and undercut the claims of one's own experiential account of oppression . . . to represent adequately (as proxy) the interests of the Other" (91). Yet, this well-worn suggestion that we deconstruct our positionalities in relation to the communities we represent does not adequately answer the complicated nexus of identity, experience, and marginality or authority. In order to demonstrate the evolving and still unresolved issue of positionality and subaltern authority within contemporary queer studies, even where such autobiographical acts of deconstruction are in place, I turn to the self-representational gestures of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Judith Halberstam in the last sections of this article.
Both Sedgwick and Halberstam are examples of Champagne's "privileged marginals," as highly visible and respected theorists in the Weld-Sedgwick as a founding force and Halberstam as a newer but increasingly ubiquitous presence. Sedgwick, in particular, has offered especially bold examples of the academically autobiographical that remain theoretically important within any conversation regarding gay, lesbian, and queer subjectivities in the academy. Halberstam, while by no means as comfortable or as frequent a confessor as Sedgwick, provides a more contemporary engagement with the academic production of knowledge on queer cultures. Of course, Sedgwick, as a "straight" woman (albeit "straight with the twist" to use Calvin Thomas's parlance) who writes about gay men, and Halberstam, as a butch lesbian who writes about female masculinity, obviously hold very different sorts of relationships to the autobiographical overdeterminancy of queer theorizing. Yet, in their complicated efforts to situate themselves in relation to their subjects, Sedgwick and Halberstam similarly evidence the tricky terrain of identity and experience at stake within academic discourses.
QUEER(ING) THEORY
It is arguable that many of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's ideas, which pioneered "queer theory" as a contemporary methodology, are situated as explicit engagements with the personal and political contexts of producing academic knowledge on homosexuality. For instance, Sedgwick describes the "queer" of queer theory as a uniquely and sometimes speciWcally autobiographical gesture of radical self-identiWcation, while "'gay' and 'lesbian' still present themselves . . . as objective, empirical categories governed by empirical rules of evidence" (Tendencies, 9). Although the usefulness of pitting "queer" against "gay and lesbian" has quickly lost its theoretical appeal, it is important to note that the politics of self-representation play a pivotal role in Sedgwick's original conception of queer theory as its own distinct venture. Sedgwick writes:
"Queer" seems to hinge much more radically and explicitly on a person's undertaking particular, performative acts of experimental selfperception and Wliation. A hypothesis worth making explicit: that there are important senses in which "queer" can signify only when attached to the Wrst person. (9, original emphasis) Sedgwick does not offer comment on the autobiographical underpinnings of queer scholarship as a warning or complaint about the risks of exposure, but rather she turns the tables to seize the opportunity for a critical practice rested upon the performative redeployment of academic argumentation and authorial identity. Sedgwick announces, "I'm . . . interested in how it would be possible to programmatically refuse to exclude the personal, the realm of the autobiographical, or the Wrst person, but at the same time pull those elements into new and unexpected relations to theory and the writing process" ("A Talk," 84). In other words, far from denying the self-referential connotations of queer scholarship, Sedgwick reclaims the personal as an antinormative engagement or a "queering" of critical discourses.
At the same time, the confessional writing performed by Sedgwick does not produce essentialized subject positions or naturalized identities that merely replace objectivity with the evidence of experience to resuscitate argumentative credibility. Sedgwick, in fact, appears to altogether refute the idea that Wrsthand knowledge of gay male cultures forms the basis of her scholarship in her foreword to the second edition of Between Men, where she explains that at the time of writing the book she "was very involved with lesbian-inXected feminist culture and critique, but . . . actually knew only one openly gay man" (viii). This is not to say that Sedgwick rejects her personal connections to queer cultures but rather to point out that such ties do not seem to anchor any kind of academic authority upon a shared identity with her subject(s). For instance, Sedgwick does not reveal bisexual or lesbian tendencies (a claim that would perhaps possess more legitimacy given her corporeal constitution as a woman). Instead, she confesses that her "own most formative inXuence from a quite early age has been a viscerally intense, highly speculative . . . cross-identiWcation with gay men and gay male cultures" (Tendencies, 14) . In "White Glasses," the Wnal essay in Tendencies, Sedgwick ("with a fat woman's deWance") goes as far as to claim her "identiWcation?" and her "identity?" as a gay man (Tendencies, 256). Linda Anderson explains of Sedgwick, "What is at stake here, of course, is how far 'I' can identify across the naturalizing discourses of gender and sexuality, how far 'I' can claim an identity which is at odds with how 'I' am perceived" (74). Sedgwick situates such counterintuitive and conXicting processes of (self)identiWcation as axiomatic of queer theory in Epistemology of the Closet: "Axiom 7: The paths of allo-identiWcation are likely to be strange and recalcitrant. So are the paths of auto-identiWcation" (59). 7 Of course, Sedgwick's position as a married, "straight" woman and one of the most frequently invoked practitioners of queer theory is itself a fascinating example of the "strange and recalcitrant" ways in which queer scholarship can encompass many other identiWcations beyond gay and lesbian. Whereas most might consider Sedgwick's contribution to queer theoretics as primarily limited to gay male sexualities and literatures, I view Sedgwick's body of work as much more expansive, especially if we realize her autobiographical writing as indicative of how heterosexuality may operate under the sign of "queer."
8 While she is very careful about the "deWnitional center" remaining focused on same-sex object choices, Sedgwick activates "queer" as a practice of (self)identiWcation that is not limited to or synonymous with gay and lesbian identities (8). Indeed, Sedgwick's own participation in queer theory and her promotion of allo/crossidentiWcatory relationships helps unhinge the expectation that one's queer scholarship is reXective of one's sexual identity in the most simplistic of terms.
Nevertheless, the autobiographical in Sedgwick's work indicates, even as it problematizes, the subject(ive) position from which one constructs knowledge as an intellectually and politically salient category of de/legitimization within contemporary gay, lesbian, and queer studies. Linda Alcoff, in her article "The Problems of Speaking for Others," conWrms, "a speaker's location (which I take here to refer to her social location, a social identity) has an epistemically signiWcant impact on that speaker's claims and can serve either to authorize or de-authorize her speech" (98). Widespread acceptance of this claim, as Alcoff notes, has led many to agree, "the study of and the advocacy for the oppressed must be done principally by the oppressed themselves" (98). Alcoff, much like the aforementioned Champagne, consequently advises that self-reXexivity about authorial "location and context . . . should be an explicit part of every serious discursive practice in which we engage" in order to circumvent the ethical pitfalls of "speaking for" others (112). While the essentialist assumptions, intellectual conWnes, and political inefWcacy of basing one's scholarship only upon shared group memberships have been debated at length, the self-reXexive negotiation of authorial identity in relation to one's subject matter marks an important shift in the production of academic knowledge, where "speaking as" or from one's marginalized positionality can authenticate a domain of authority.
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Although her autobiographical work unsettles the very idea that only gay men and lesbian women can produce credible knowledge about homosexual subjects, Sedgwick admits that theorizing that deviates from one's own (perceived) identity to cross "politically charged boundaries, whether of gender, of class, of race, of sexuality, of nation," has demanded "narrative . . . of a directly personal sort" in her own work (Epistemology, 59-60). Such a demand for the autobiographical, especially in relation to the cross-cultural engagements Sedgwick proposes as emblematic of queer theory, demonstrates the methodological impact of identity and experiential knowledge on the history of our critical practices. Jeffrey Gray even argues that "what beganin feminism and minority studies-as a needed acknowledgment of subject position, problematized or not, has become an institutional directive," and concludes, "the failure to write identity can be a mistake" (67). Under such conditions of contemporary critical inquiry, which have come to expect a certain amount of self-reXexivity and personal accountability for work on "minority" studies, the selfidentiWcatory seems doubly unavoidable for queer scholars.
EXPERIENCE REQUIRED?
Especially as queer studies has moved from a primary focus on literary and philosophical debates to encompass cultural and ethnographic studies of subjugated knowledges and peoples, the articulation of one's subject position is ever more pressing and necessary for several interrelated reasons. Since the researcher ultimately possesses the power of interpretation, which may be further marked by economic, racial, gender, and educational inequalities, the potentially imperialistic or colonizing dimensions of research on the historically marginalized are (supposed to be) lessened by the ethical acknowledgment that one's own positionality is implicated in structures of power that may be beyond immediate control or recognition. The declaration of location (which often amounts to various identity claims and disclaimers) is thus approved of as a thoughtful engagement with the situatedness of knowledge production and reception.
Moreover, the widening scope of queer studies over the last decades has shifted our sense of audience to include nonacademic readers in addition to scholars and students. Readers outside the academy, who have suffered the harmful effects of cultural exploitation and intellectual elitism, may respond with far less suspicion or hostility to projects that originate with shared cultural experiences and personal investments. As a result, situating one's work in relation to one's personal history may seem even more epistemically sound and principled. The terrain of dual or multiple audiences and their various investments is not a condition of scholarship that most academic writers expect to encounter but one that queer studies continues to be absolutely overdetermined by.
Yet, the interests of nonacademic and academic readers of queer criticism are sometimes more aligned and overlapping than commonly treated, especially as personal identiWcation and political commitment over intellectual curiosity are generally considered the favorable, even expected, conditions for work on queer subjects. For better or worse, queer scholarship is often thus fostered as a personal, political, and intellectual occasion. Judith Halberstam, for instance, is explicit about the purpose of her recent work on female masculinity in highly personalized terms, as she claims an outright allegiance to "shaping an intellectual project around issues of great personal importance" (Female Masculinity, xii). Halberstam speciWes, "this book is an attempt to make my own female masculinity plausible, credible, and real" (19). These confessed interests and personal identiWcations are praised by critic Rachel Adams in her GLQ review of Female Masculinity: "Halberstam's . . . is not simply a theoretical exercise: Female Masculinity is compelling precisely because it is framed as a personal, as well as critical and political, project" (471). According to Adams, Halberstam's interestedness in her academic writing is a valued sign of a political commitment backed by personal investment.
I concur with Adams's appreciation for Halberstam's personal and political motivations, but I also recognize the autobiographical in Halberstam's work as reXective of the anxieties of authority that attend queer theorizing, especially when the subject(s) under intellectual consideration might be more or less removed from the realm of personal experience. 10 Indeed, the relation between area of inquiry and the academic's own identity is an exceptionally dense and vexed set of issues within transgender studies-to which Halberstam's work, in its examination of gender variance, most certainly belongs. The Weld is marked by "insider"/"outsider" debates, notably in the controversy around Janice Raymond's book Transsexual Empire: The Making of the She-Male (1979) and Bernice Hausman's Changing Sex: Transsexualism, Technology, and the Idea of Gender (1995) . In "The 'Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto," Sandy Stone, a transactivist and selfidentiWed transgender person, expresses Werce resentment toward those non-trans-identiWed researchers (such as Raymond, in this case) who write as if trans people could not speak for themselves or theorize their own experiences. This critical resistance should not be confused with unsophisticated anti-intellectualism. Stone explains, "As with males theorizing about women from the beginning of time, theorists of gender have seen transsexuals as possessing something less than agency [and therefore] transsexuals are infantilized, considered too illogical or irresponsible to achieve true subjectivity" (294). Within the past decade, much transgender theorizing from academics and nonacademics alike has been mobilized in effort to respond, reject, or "talk back" to those hegemonic discourses within medical and academic communities that are not situated within the lived experience of gender variance. 11 The intensely politicized and frequently inhospitable conditions of scholarship on transgender cultural practices frame or overdetermine the ways we might interpret Halberstam's positioning of herself in relation to her work. For instance, Halberstam expresses a keen awareness of the kinds of problematic practices academics have been accused of and the negative responses non-identity-based writing can garner in one of the four autobiographical moments in Female Masculinity. Halberstam takes account of this issue of power and authority within transgender studies by documenting her own place "as a nontranssexual who has written about transsexuality" and the kinds of "hostile and suspicious" responses that her previously published article "F2M: The Making of Female Masculinity" received from the trans-identiWed (Female Masculinity, 145) . In reference to her more recent concentration on drag king cultures, Halberstam admits, "I have had to learn how to talk to drag kings so as not to cancel out their deWnitions and interpretations and so as to Wnd some common ground between my investments in the project and their own" ("Mackdaddy," 108). Here, Halberstam indicates a self-reXexive interrogation and renegotiation of her own investments and critical practices in deference to the agency of her research subjects, who have every right to view her interest in drag kinging with trepidation.
Indeed, however much Halberstam's theoretical project on drag kinging overlaps her own personal identiWcations with female masculinity and her political commitments to other women who experience their masculinities as besieged, this does not save her work from being criticized as "outsider" theorizing. In an interview with Halberstam, Silas Flipper (member of the drag group, the Dodge Bros.) says: "Sometimes when something gets a lot of attention and college kids start to write papers about it (no offense) this can be a bad thing" (as quoted in Halberstam's coedited [with Del LaGrace Volcano] volume, The Drag King Book, 139). Here, Flipper dismissively situates Halberstam as an outsider, a "college kid" looking to write about something trendy, and worries about how this kind of voyeuristic attention from those like Halberstam might "commodify what's really interesting about these scenes" (139). Flipper's criticisms do seem couched in antiintellectualism, and yet cannot be dismissed outright as they are implicated within a history of tensions between academics with research interests in so-called subcultures and members of those communities that reject such interests as objectifying and commodifying.
Halberstam's work on drag king cultures nonetheless offers convincing evidence that the divisions between academic and nonacademic communities are permeable. For instance, the large-scale portraits of Halberstam that are printed in relation to her work on female masculinity suggest the indistinguishability of Halberstam's scholarly and personal investments. As Kim Michasiw notes, "the packaging of the paperback [edition of the scholarly text] is notable . . . for featuring a photograph of the author, a practice that is not unknown but is occasional enough among academics to solicit notice" (157). If the portrait of an academic is rare enough to give notice, as Michasiw argues, Halberstam's image serves as an especially bold example of the self-representational in academic contexts. 12 For instance, the photographs of Halberstam are not segregated but placed among the other photos used throughout. 13 If just skimming the images, one could easily confuse Halberstam with the others who do wear masculine attire as drag. Halberstam herself notes that her masculine appearance in drag performance spaces has often resulted in her being mistaken for a drag king (Female Masculinity, 244) . Since all photos (both those of Halberstam and the drag kings) are the same size and mingled, there is no clear visual differentiation between Halberstam and those "real" drag kings she studies. In a Genders interview with Annamarie Jagose, Halberstam explains that her portraits serve as a "visual referent" that "forces the reader of my work to factor me into the accounts of masculinity that they are reading."
Yet, it is unclear what exactly this factoring in of Halberstam's image is supposed to enact. The fact that Halberstam's portrait in Female Masculinity is positioned directly across the page from where she confronts the difWculties of ethnographic research (and the resistance to her project expressed by her drag king informants) seems to afWrm that issues of critical identity and authority are at stake. Although her drag king subjects position her as an outsider to their community, Halberstam's image implies that she is both outsider and insider. Halberstam herself announces, "I do not consider myself to be completely outside the drag king culture . . . although I have never performed as a drag king . . . [and] do not wear male clothing as drag" (Female Masculinity, 244) . Whereas a queer theoretical perspective, such as that proclaimed in Halberstam's work, might Wnd it productive to see the lines between the different forms of female masculinity blur, Halberstam's own project (perhaps conXictingly) insists upon clearer differentiation among categories of female masculinity. In fact, the main thrust of her work insists upon the need and value of a more precise taxonomy.
Insofar as the slippage among different types of masculinity only occurs when it comes to Halberstam's own relation to drag king cultures, I am wary of the function and effect of the self-representational in her work. The images of Halberstam in Female Masculinity and throughout her work on drag most certainly serve as a radical insistence upon the visibility of the queer academic and how personal investments might determine research projects. Nevertheless, I fear that it is equally possible that the self-representational follows a much more conservative agenda by fusing Halberstam's self-identiWcation or "authenticity" as a masculine woman to her authority as a scholar who writes about female masculinity. Rachel Adams, who interprets Halberstam's portrait as evidencing the "dual advantage" of experiential and theoretical knowledge, validates this concern (471). The kind of visibility performed in Halberstam's text might not disrupt the normative conditions of academic argumentation or the intellectual ghettoism of the queer scholar but merely couple the authoritative channels of objectivity with the empirical evidence of "insider" knowledge. More problematic yet, her self-representational writing is lauded as an advantageous and principled negotiation of difference.
THE FUTURE(S) OF QUEER METHODOLOGY
There seems something fundamentally appropriate about Sarah Chinn's declaration that contemporary queer studies is a "mineWeld . . . strewn with fragrant Xowers as well as shattering mortars" and her troubled conclusion that "it's impossible to intuit which I'll step on at any given juncture" (244). This recognition of instability and risk may make my argument here that queer positionalities have an authoritative function seem a bit premature. Clearly, the only authority that a queer positionality acquires is limited to the domain of nonnormative sexualities and genders, where we are both assumed and expected to speak from personal experience. Seizing this space for legitimacy, however circumscribed or problematic, may seem an acceptable tactic for professional survival, especially in these times of job scarcity; as David Román need not remind us, "A career based in lesbian and gay studies still holds no guarantees" (169). Many undoubtedly feel that we must be practical, Wrst serve queer folk or other historically oppressed groups by playing into an academic system that confers authority to the marginalized primarily through identity and experience, and worry about the effects of tokenization afterward. Others might genuinely feel that only those with personal experience have the right to speak about minority cultures.
Although I am sympathetic with both these strains of thought, if we continue to afWrm the conXation between queer scholarship and queer authorship as the basis for this tenuous (not to be confused with tenurable) authority, then we as queer and nonqueer scholars risk reinforcing the idea that antihomophobic inquiry is only necessary to those with only the most recognizable of vested interests. In other words, we risk conWrming the heteronormative suspicion that the production of knowledge on homosexuality is only ever an intimate concern. In the long run, this kind of thinking impairs our most worthy efforts to transgress not simply the norms of academic argumentation but the purview as well.
For example, the methodological necessity to declare positionality when trespassing the domain of self-sameness, as evidenced in both Sedgwick and Halberstam, not only reinforces normative concepts of identity and empirical knowledge but also ultimately facilitates the idea that the proper object of queer studies is limited to sexual and gender transgressions. Such disciplinary limitation engenders a so-called racially, economically, nationally unmarked analysis that normalizes queer theory as white, middle-class, Euro-American. (Unsurprisingly, the "privileged marginals" of queer theory canonized and duly represented here are white.) Make no mistake; this is not a minor misgiving. I consider it an enormous problem that issues of race, for a primary example, remain special or secondary considerations in gay and lesbian/queer studies, even after at least two decades of protest and denial.
In order to take seriously the very valid critique that "one of the great failings of queer theory . . . has been . . . [an] inability to incorporate into analysis . . . the roles that race, class, and gender play in deWning people's differing relations to dominant and normalizing power" (Cohen 457), we must take the important Wrst step to refuse the autobiographical overdeterminancy of academic studies of marginality. In fact, I cannot emphasize enough how detrimental I see the ongoing suturing of identity and authority to be to the future of academic cultures, especially as we recognize the necessity of an intersectional analysis that accounts for the embeddedness of sexuality in an immensely complex nexus of race, class, gender, and nationality-to name only a very few considerations. The oft-cited need for more complex knowledges of sexuality, as well as other interlocking cultural formations, absolutely demands that we imagine more expansive possibilities for epistemological, personal, and political engagement with others and ourselves. Just as the work of antiracism should not be left to people of color alone, antihomophobic theorizing should not be left to gays and lesbians. Obviously, my most immediate audience for this conversation about sexual identities in the academy is primarily other queer theorists, but my conclusions here invite scholars across the disciplines to realize their own place within academic cultures. Indeed, as Judith Roof and Robyn Wiegman observe, "African Americans are always assumed to be African Americanists, as though the ontological scripting of blackness in Western culture is the only intellectual category, the only site of analysis that whites think would be interesting to them. Or worse, blackness is the only notable experience an African American critic can have" (93). If we academicsqueer, black, or otherwise-can only legitimately express research or teacherly interests about our "own" communities, we will continue to Wnd ourselves pigeonholed and the entire spectrum of academic thought will suffer the consequences. To better develop the futures of academic writing and thinking, we must more carefully consider the signiWcance of autobiographical writing as part of our methodological arsenal. 2. In response to a post on September 2, 2005, from person who was concerned about "outing" oneself in the job application process, "Martina" described her negative experiences on the job market and the strategies she had for concealing her sexual orientation. If anyone might consider issues of sexual identity to be well behind us, the overtly homophobic discussion that took place in response to the original post demonstrates the risks of coming out and how these are closely associated with one's scholarship and teaching. See http://chronicle.com/jobs/forums/read.php?f=27941&t=27941. 
Notes

